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premises. 7 The underlying reason for this rule has been explained
as being that the landlord's denial of the use and enjoyment of a
part of the premises is a wrongful act and, since the law will not
permit a wrongdoer to apportion his own wrong, the tenant will not
be held liable even for that portion of the premises retained and
occupied.8 The judgment here does violence to that principle by
determining the value of that portion of the premises which were denied to the tenant, subtracting it from the total rent, and awarding
the remainder to the landlord. In effect the judgment permits the
landlord to recover on a quantum meruit basis even though, because
of his wrongful act, the law precludes a recovery on the agreement
itself.
It is submitted that the law of this state as interpreted by the
higher tribunals is contra to the rule of decision herein. No criticism is offered as to the actual result reached by the court. The
judgment is no doubt a fair adjustment of the differences between
the parties and may be classified under the heading of practical justice. The query is directed rather at the means employed to serve
that end. The Pike ' case clearly settles the rule of decision applicable to a case wherein the tenant has been constructively evicted
from a portion of the premises by a wrongful act of the landlord.
It establishes that, in such a case, the tenant must pay the rent reserved, and seek damages for that portion of the premises, the use
and enjoyment of which was denied to him by the landlord's wrongful act or omission by interposition of a counterclaim based upon a
breach of either express or implied covenants of quiet enjoyment
contained in the lease.
P. S. C., JR.

LIFE INSURANcE-RIGHTS OF BENEFICIARY-SURRENDER OF
POLICY FOR CASH VALUE BY INCOMPETENT INSURED.-On May 13,

1944, the insured changed the beneficiary in accordance with the right
reserved in each policy and substituted his own estate for the plaintiff, his widow, as beneficiary. On May 15, 1944, he surrendered the
policies in accordance with the provisions thereof, and received a full
cash surrender value. On May 13, and May 15, 1944 and thereafter until his death, the insured was insane and lacked mental
capacity to perform any legal act. Defendant had no notice of in7

City of New York v. Pike Realty Corp., 247 N. Y. 245, 160 N. E. 359

(1928).
8
Two Rector Street Corporation v. Bien, 226 App. Div. 73, 234 N. Y.
Supp. 409 (1st Dep't 1929); Fifth Avenue Building Co. v. Kernochan, 221
N. Y. 370, 117 N. E. 579 (1917).
9 City of New York v. Pike Realty Corp., 247 N. Y. 245, 248, 160 N. E.
359, 361 (1928).
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sured's insanity and lack of capacity until after insured's death.
Defendant acted on the change of beneficiary and paid the surrender
value of the policies in good faith and in the regular course of its
business. Insured was at no time under guardianship. Held, for
plaintiff. The beneficiary of a life insurance policy has a qualified
property interest in the contract which ripens into an absolute right
if the insured dies without having effected a valid change of beneficiary. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to recover the difference
between the cash surrender value and the face value of the policy.
Wodell v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., - Mass. -, 67 N. E.
(2d) 469 (1946).
It is clearly the general, if not the universal, rule that if at the
time the insured attempted to change the beneficiary under an insurance policy the insured was incompetent, such change is ineffective, and the original beneficiary has such an interest in the proceeds
as will entitle him to avoid the change and recover under the policy.'
It has been held that, while the beneficiary had no vested interest at
the time of the alleged transfer, he had a right after the death of the
insured to raise the question, (as to whether the insured was incompetent when he executed the transfer), the same as an heir at law
has a right to intervene after the death2 of his ancestor to set aside
a grant made while he was incompetent.
The defendant relies on the rule laid down in Reed v. Mattapan
Deposit & Trust Co.8 and Leighton v. Haverhill Savings Bank 4
wherein it was held that a bank which in good faith, in the ordinary
course of business and without knowledge of his condition, had
cashed the check of a depositor who had become insane, could not
be compelled to pay the money again. The defendant therefore contends that an analogy should be drawn from those cases so as to
prevent it from paying twice. The plaintiff relies on those cases
holding that the original beneficiary is permitted to recover the balance over the surrender value paid to an insane insured. 5
The court in the instant case pointed out that the doctrine in
the Reed and Leighton cases was equitable in its nature and applies
only to cases where the insurance company had paid the full value
of the policy either to a changed beneficiary, or to an assignee. The
doctrine asserted by the defendant, being equitable in its nature,
2See Note (1936) 105 A. L. R. 950, 951.
2Grand Lodge A. 0. U. W. v. Frank, 133 Mich. 232, 94 N. W. 731 (1903);
see Knights of the Modern MacCabees v. Sharp, 163 Mich. 449, 128 N. W.
786 (1910); Wells v. Covenant Mut. Ben. Ass'n, 126 Mo. 630, 29 S. W. 607

(1895).
s 198 Mass. 306, 84 N. E. 469 (1908).
4227 Mass. 67, 116 N. E. 414 (1917).
5Nutter v. Des Moines Life Ins. Co., 156 Iowa 539, 136 N. W. 891 (1912);
Hicks v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 166 Iowa 532, 147 N. W. 883
(1914); Sluder v. National Americans, 101 Kan. 320, 166 Pac. 482 (1917);
cf. Wells v. Covenant Mut. Ben. Ass'n, 126 Mo. 630, 29 S. W. 607 (1895).
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should be moulded to accomplish equitable results. The court therefore held that an equitable result would be brought about if the policy
were regarded as reinstated, any necessary adjustments being made
with respect to premiums and dividends, and if the surrender value
were credited to the company as of the date the company paid it
to the insured. Plaintiff then would recover the balance of the total
value of the insurance.
B. H. A.

NEGLIGENCE-CHILDREN

UNDER DISABILITY-INFANT

THREE

Two MONTHS OLD CONCLUSIVELY PRESUMED INCAPABLE
OF NEGLIGENCE.-Defendant, approaching an intersection while driving along in his automobile, struck the plaintiff's son who darted out
from between two parked cars into the path of defendant's automobile. The child died that same day. At the trial, evidence was
introduced showing the deceased to have been brighter and more
mentally alert than the normal child of his age. The court submitted
to the jury the question of defendant's negligence while driving the
automobile which struck the child, and also an issue as to the contributory negligence of the deceased, who was an infant of three years
and two months at the time of the accident. Plaintiff's counsel requested a charge that "a child of the age of three years and two months
is non sui juris and incapable of being guilty of negligence." The
request was refused and the jury brought in a verdict for the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court's verdict ' and
plaintiff appeals by permission to the Court of Appeals. Held, reversed and a new trial granted. A child of the age of three years
and two months is non sui juris and incapable of being guilty of negligence. Verni v. Johnson, 295 N. Y. 436, 68 N. E. (2d) 431 (1946).
At what age a child is presumed to be incapable of contributory
negligence has long divided the courts. 2 In the United States, the
weight of authority, as regards a child between three years and four
years of age is in favor of a conclusive presumption of incapacity.3
However, many courts hold that age alone does not determine whether
a child is sui juris but that experience, maturity, and intelligence also
enter into the picture and it is a question for the jury to decide.4 It
YEARS AND

1269 App. Div. 997, 58 N. Y. S. (2d) 382 (2d Dep't 1945).
2 "The law does not disregard variations in capacity among children of
the same age, and does not arbitrarily fix an age at which the duty to exercise
some care begins or an age at which an infant must exercise the same care as
an adult." Camardo v. New York State Ry., 247 N. Y. 111, 116, 159 N. E.

879, 880 (1928).

34 Note (1937) 107 A. L. R. 4, 100.

Leach v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. R., 48 F. (2d) 722 (C. C. A. 6th,

1931)

(experience, mental capacity and particular circumstances of case);

